Three Lawful Kills (Nasa'i's Narration)
Nasa'i 4061 records the same 'three lawful kills' framework as Bukhari 6878 (entry b12). The Nasa'i version provides independent chain attestation. The three categories — married adulterer (stoning), murderer (qiṣāṣ), apostate (death) — establish the canonical Sunni framework for capital punishment of Muslims. Joseph Schacht, An Introduction to Islamic Law (Clarendon Press, 1964), the foundational Western reference for Islamic jurisprudence, identifies these hadd and qiṣāṣ categories as the bedrock of the classical criminal law system, noting that their Quranic and hadith grounding made them uniquely resistant to judicial discretion.
The substantive issues are addressed in entry b12. The Nasa'i entry adds:
1. The Sunan-genre legal preservation. Nasa'i's collection emphasises legal application above all. The 'three lawful kills' framework is foundational to Islamic criminal law. Rudolph Peters, Crime and Punishment in Islamic Law: Theory and Practice from the Sixteenth to the Twenty-First Century (Cambridge University Press, 2005), documents how the classical hadd doctrine — covering zina (adultery/fornication), qiṣāṣ (retaliation), and riddah (apostasy) — was transmitted through precisely the Sunan-genre collections and applied in Ottoman and later courts across the Muslim world.
2. The persistent application. The framework has been operative throughout Islamic history. Modern Muslim-majority states apply versions of the three categories: stoning for married adulterers, qiṣāṣ for murder, death for apostasy. Peters traces enforcement records from the sixteenth century through the twenty-first, demonstrating legal continuity rather than historical aberration.
3. The cumulative effect. The three categories together establish that Muslim life is forfeit only for: (a) consensual sexual conduct (married adultery), (b) lethal violence against another (qiṣāṣ), or (c) religious choice (apostasy). Two of the three are problematic by modern moral standards: consensual conduct should not warrant death, and religious choice should not warrant death. Robert Spencer, The Truth About Muhammad (Regnery, 2006), criticises the multi-collection attestation of the death-for-apostasy norm as evidence that it is authentically Muhammadan rather than a later doctrinal addition.
The analysis from entry b12 applies fully here.
- P1. Nasa'i 4061 records the canonical 'three lawful kills' framework: married adulterer, murderer, apostate.
- P2. The hadith is preserved across all major canonical collections.
- P3. Two of the three categories (adultery, apostasy) are punishments for non-violent acts — consensual sexual conduct and religious choice.
- P4. The framework has been operative in Islamic criminal law for fourteen centuries.
- P5. Modern Muslim-majority states apply the framework in varying degrees.
- P6. The framework treats consensual sexual conduct and religious choice as offences warranting death.
- P7. A morally serious framework limits capital punishment to severe offences against persons. (See entry b12.)
Nasa'i 4061 reinforces the 'three lawful kills' framework. The Nasa'i preservation, alongside Bukhari, Muslim, and other collections, anchors the canonical capital punishment categories. Two of the three categories — married adultery and apostasy — are problematic by modern moral standards. The framework continues in modern application. (See entry b12 for fuller treatment.)
The three categories reflect Islamic justice — punishment for genuinely serious offences.
Adultery and apostasy are non-violent. Capital punishment for them is incompatible with modern moral frameworks. (See entry b12.)
Stoning has stringent evidentiary requirements (four witnesses) — practically rarely applied.
It has been applied across history and continues today in some jurisdictions. (See entry b12.)
Apostasy means treason, not religious change.
The text uses religious-change language. Jonathan A.C. Brown, Misquoting Muhammad (Oneworld, 2014), acknowledges that contemporary Muslim scholars such as Ali Gomaa and Yusuf al-Qaradawi attempt to reframe riddah as political betrayal, distinguishing a punishable "apostasy of transgression" (public ridicule, calling others to leave Islam) from a supposedly private, non-punishable change of belief. Brown's own account, however, concedes that the classical jurists drew no such public/private line — death was the prescribed penalty without reference to political context. The hadith language here ("one who deserts his religion and abandons the Muslim community") conflates religious exit with communal defection, but the punishment is triggered by the religious act, not by any separately proven treasonous deed. (See entry b12.)
Modern Muslim states have reformed the framework.
Reform is uneven. Many states retain the framework. (See entry b12.)
Other religions historically had capital punishment for religious offences.
They have repudiated it; Islam has not. (See entry b12.)