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Argument 3 of 20 · Sunan Abī Dāwūd

Blind Man Kills His Pregnant Umm Walad for Insulting Muhammad — No Penalty

Abu Dawud 4363 (with parallels 4359-4364)
Abu Dawud 4363 — Narrated ʿAbdullah ibn ʿAbbas: "A blind man had a slave-mother (umm walad) who used to abuse the Prophet and disparage him. He forbade her but she did not stop, and he rebuked her but she did not give up her habit. One night she began to slander the Prophet and abuse him. So he took a dagger, placed it on her belly, pressed it, and killed her. A child who came between her legs was smeared with the blood that was there. The next morning the matter was mentioned to the Messenger of Allah. He gathered the people and said: 'I adjure by Allah the man who has done this action and I adjure him by my right over him that he should stand up.' Jumping over the necks of the people and trembling, the blind man stood up and sat before the Messenger of Allah. He said: 'Messenger of Allah, I am her master; she used to abuse you and disparage you; I forbade her, but she did not stop, and I rebuked her, but she did not abandon her habit. I have two sons like pearls from her, and she was kind to me. Last night she began to abuse and disparage you, so I took a dagger, placed it on her belly, and pressed it till I killed her.' The Messenger of Allah said: 'Bear witness, there is no blood-money for her.'"

Abu Dawud 4363 records one of the most morally severe hadith in the Sunan literature. A blind Muslim had a woman as his umm walad (a slave concubine who had borne his children, with the Islamic-legal status that she would be freed upon his death). She had reportedly insulted Muhammad. The blind man rebuked her repeatedly. One night, she insulted Muhammad again. He took a dagger, placed it on her pregnant belly (some narrations specify this; the killed child 'between her legs' indicates near-term pregnancy), and pressed until she died. The killed unborn child fell out of her body.

Muhammad gathered the community to find out who had done this. The blind man stood up trembling and confessed. He explained: she was the mother of his sons, she had been kind to him, but her insults to the Prophet drove him to kill her.

Muhammad's ruling: 'No blood-money for her' (alā la dama lahā). That is, the killing was lawful; no compensation was owed to anyone. The blind man received no punishment for killing his pregnant umm walad.

The hadith is in Abu Dawud (sahih or hasan grade in classical evaluations), Nasa'i, and other sources.

The theological and ethical problems:

1. Blasphemy as a death sentence imposed by an individual. The hadith establishes that a Muslim may kill a non-Muslim (or anyone) for insulting Muhammad, with no judicial process and no penalty. This is not formal hadd judgment by an Islamic court; it is private vigilante killing, ratified by Muhammad after the fact.

2. Pregnancy ignored. The woman was pregnant — possibly with the blind man's child. The killing of an unborn child should, in any defensible legal framework, be a separate offence. Muhammad's ruling does not address it. The unborn child was killed alongside the mother with no recognition or compensation.

3. The umm walad relationship. The slave-mother had borne the blind man's children, a relationship under Islamic law that established a long-term familial bond and would have led to her eventual freedom. The hadith preserves the blind man's note that she 'was kind to me' — confirming the close relationship. The killing was intimate-partner femicide, not stranger violence.

4. Blasphemy law in classical Islam. Abu Dawud 4363 is one of the foundational hadith for the classical Islamic law of blasphemy. The principle established: insulting the Prophet is a capital offence; vigilante killing of the insulter may be permissible. Classical fiqh formalised this: the four Sunni schools all hold that insulting Muhammad warrants death, with debate only about procedural details.

5. Modern application. The blasphemy law remains operative. Pakistan's Blasphemy Law (Section 295-C of the Penal Code, mandating death for insulting Muhammad) cites this hadith family. The killing of Salman Taseer in 2011 — the governor of Punjab who criticised the blasphemy law — was justified by his killer (Mumtaz Qadri) on the basis of this and parallel material. Qadri was hailed as a hero by significant portions of Pakistani religious opinion. The 2020 killing of Samuel Paty in France, the 2022 attack on Salman Rushdie, and many other modern incidents trace their religious justification to this hadith.

6. The Quranic context. Q 33:57-61 ('those who annoy Allah and His Messenger... a humiliating punishment... killed wherever they are found') and Q 9:12 ('fight the leaders of disbelief... no oath is binding on them') provide Quranic support for severe response to mockery of Muhammad. Combined with Abu Dawud 4363, the framework establishes that mockery of Muhammad is among the gravest offenses, warranting death.

7. The 'no blood-money' principle. Muhammad's verdict — 'no blood-money' (lā damm lahā) — establishes that the killer owed nothing for the act. In normal Islamic homicide law, even justified killing typically entails some compensation to the family. The 'no blood-money' verdict treats the woman and her unborn child as legally worthless. Their lives had no monetary value because the act of killing them was permitted.

  1. P1. Abu Dawud 4363 records a blind Muslim killing his pregnant slave-mother for insulting Muhammad, with no punishment from Muhammad afterwards.
  2. P2. Muhammad ratified the killing with the verdict 'no blood-money for her' — meaning the killing was lawful and uncompensated.
  3. P3. The killing ended the lives of both the woman and her unborn child; no separate consideration was given to the unborn child.
  4. P4. The hadith establishes a foundational text for classical Islamic blasphemy law, treating insults against Muhammad as capital offence.
  5. P5. The hadith permits private vigilante killing of insulters, not just judicial execution under formal Islamic court process.
  6. P6. Modern blasphemy killings (Salman Taseer 2011, Samuel Paty 2020, the Rushdie attack 2022) cite this textual tradition as justification.
  7. P7. A morally serious revelation does not authorise killing of a pregnant woman — including her unborn child — for verbal insult, without trial, by her own household.

Abu Dawud 4363 is one of the most ethically severe hadith in the Sunan literature. A blind man kills his pregnant slave-mother for insulting Muhammad; Muhammad approves and pronounces no penalty. The hadith establishes that insults against Muhammad warrant death, that vigilante killing is permitted, that the killing of an unborn child collateral to the woman's death is legally invisible. Modern blasphemy law and the killings of critics across the Muslim world trace their religious legitimacy to this and parallel material. The text is exactly what we would expect of a 7th-century leader consolidating tribal-religious authority through lethal suppression of dissent, and exactly what we would not expect of a divine teaching about the value of human life and freedom of speech.

Common Muslim response · 1

The slave-mother was a long-term blasphemer who refused correction — the killing was a last resort after repeated rebuke.

Counter-response

The 'last resort' framing presupposes that blasphemy warrants death as an end-state. The blind man's repeated rebukes do not establish his right to kill her; they establish his frustration. In any defensible legal framework, persistent verbal offence does not warrant private killing of the offender by her household. The 'last resort' is the framing of vigilante violence, not of justice.

Common Muslim response · 2

Muhammad's ruling reflected the unique offence of blasphemy against a prophet — not a general principle of vigilante justice.

Counter-response

Classical Islamic jurisprudence has not restricted blasphemy law to cases involving prophets only — many killings of dhimmis or apostates have been justified by reference to broad blasphemy principles. And the 'no blood-money' verdict establishes a general principle: killing a blasphemer entails no compensation. This generalises beyond Muhammad-specific cases. Modern Pakistani blasphemy law applies to insults against Muhammad and the Quran broadly.

Common Muslim response · 3

The pregnancy of the slave-mother was incidental to the killing — Muhammad's verdict was about the woman, not the unborn child.

Counter-response

An unborn child was killed in the same act. Muhammad's silence on this issue is itself a moral failure — the unborn child's life was discountable. In Islamic law, killing a pregnant woman should typically incur diya for the lost child as well as the mother. Muhammad's verdict explicitly waives all compensation, which means the unborn child's life was zero-valued. This is a separate moral problem in addition to the killing of the woman.

Common Muslim response · 4

The hadith may be weaker in chain than it appears — some classical scholars have questioned its grade.

Counter-response

It is in Abu Dawud, generally accepted as one of the six canonical Sunan with high authentication standards. Modern academic Hadith scholars (Brown, Juynboll) treat the hadith as authentic to the early period, even if its grade is debated. Calling it 'weaker than appears' is a soft dismissal that does not eliminate the foundational role this hadith family has played in Islamic blasphemy law. Even granting some chain weakness, parallel material in stronger collections supports the same legal framework.

Common Muslim response · 5

Modern Muslim scholars condemn vigilante killings — the killing of Salman Taseer was wrong, even if his blasphemy was real.

Counter-response

Mumtaz Qadri (Taseer's killer) was hailed as a hero by significant numbers of Pakistani clerics and millions of ordinary Muslims; his shrine in Islamabad has become a pilgrimage site. The condemnation of vigilante killings is not universal in mainstream Sunni opinion. And the textual basis for the killings — Abu Dawud 4363 and parallels — has not been formally repudiated by mainstream institutions. The 'modern condemnation' framing oversimplifies a contested situation in which the textual tradition continues to license what some modern scholars condemn.